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DemographicEffectson PersonalSaving
in theFuture
FredericL. Pryor*
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1. Introduction
on the
growthof theU.S. economygenerallyfocusprimaryattention
Analysesof thelong-term
rateof technologicalchange.It is generallyassumedthatsavingto financethenecessaryinvestment
will not be a problem.In thisessay, I use a simulationmodel incorporating
a lifetimeincomeapI showthatin thelong
proachtowardsavingto arguethatthisassumptionis wrong.More specifically,
run,personalsavingwill declineas a shiftin thedemographicbalance betweensavers(thosein the
workingages) and dissavers(retiredworkers),and, as a result,economic growthwill taper off,
especiallysince it seemsunlikelythatthedeclinein personalsavingwill be offsetby increaseseither
in businessor government
savingor in greatercapitalinflowsfromabroad.
The argument
arethebehaviorof
proceedsinthreesteps.The twobuildingblocksoftheargument
and
the
structure
of
the
which
are
discussed
in
2. In section3, I
section
age
personalsaving
population,
presenta simulationmodelto providesome idea aboutthemagnitudesof thechangesinvolvedin the
of thepopulationshifts.In section4, I exploreseveralvariationsof
savingratewhentheage structure
themodeland,in section5, someofthemostimportant
ofthepredictedchangesin saving.
implications

2. Setting the Stage
The SavingRate
Accordingto the National Income and ProductAccounts (NIPA), whichmeasuresaving as
a flowofresources,theannualrateof personalsaving(excludingexpenditures
forconsumerdurables)
as a percentageof GDP followedan invertedU-shapepattern,
risingfrom5.2% in the 1950s to 6.7%
*
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in the 1980s beforefallingto 4.6% in the 1990s.' Businesssavingas a percentageof GDP rose about
2 percentagepointsbetweenthe 1950s and the 1970s and subsequently
leveledofffortherestof the
so
that
it
did
not
offset
the
fall
in
in
the
1990s.
The flowof fundsdata from
century
personalsaving
theFederalReserverevealsimilartrendsfromthe 1950s throughthe 1980s and a moredramaticfall
in thelast decade of thecentury.
Such a pictureof thesavingratebecomesmuddiedifwe measuresavingin termsof changesin
the ratioof saving to the GDP did not change
personalnet worth(stock data). By this yardstick,
betweenthe 1980s and the 1990s. Such resultsseem primarily
due to a rise in asset pricesand the
rather
than
rise
to
I return
to this
resulting
capitalgains
anyactivitygiving
growthin real investment.
phenomenonin section4.
For economic growth,the crucial fact is that,as a share of GDP, domesticallyfinanced
investment
remainedroughlyconstantfromthe 1950s throughthe 1980s and thenfell 2 percentage
in
the
1990s, a circumstancegivingrise to concernabout the fall of domesticsaving. As
points
a result,manyeconomistshave focusedconsiderableattention
on the causes underlying
thisshorttermfall in the saving rate duringthe 1990s (when saving is definedin termsof flowdata) and
whetherthisphenomenonwill become moreseriousin thefuture.
areoffered
to explainthechangesobservedin theflowofsavingduringthe
VVariousarguments
1990s. Some,suchas Bosworth,Burtless,and Sabelhaus(1991) and Parker(1999), arguethatitcan be
and Sabelhaus
tracedto a fallin thesavingrateat all age-groups.2
Others,suchas Gokhale,Kotlikoff,
ofincomefromtheyoungto
evidencethatthefallcame froma redistribution
(1996), providecontrary
theold and a declineinthesavingrateoftheelderlydue to a fallintheneedforsavingbothforbequest
purposes.3Still othersstressthe factthatsince most saving in the
purposesand forprecautionary
UnitedStates in recentyearshas been throughunrealizedcapitalgains, muchof the lower saving
thatis hotlydisputed.4
measuredin moretraditional
ways is due to a wealtheffect,a hypothesis
These data are drawn fromthe revised GDP accounts fromthe officialNIPA data thatcome fromU.S. Departmentof
tables5.1 and 5.2. The
Commerce,Bureauof EconomicAnalysis(1998), and Web site(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dnl.htm),
data fromthe flow of funds data come fromthe Web site of the Board of Governorsof the Federal Reserve (http://
table F.9. The stockdata are compiledfrombalance sheetinformation
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/current/zlr-3.pdf),
fromtable B.100. Gale and Sabelhaus (1999) have an excellentanalysisof the variousproblemsin definingand measuring
saving and the trendsaccordingto variousdefinitions.
2
data,Ventiand Wise (1996, p. 29) arguethereverse,namely,thatin
Using SIPP (SurveyofIncomeand ProgramParticipation)
recentyears personal saving has increased,particularlyas a resultof governmenttax measuresto encourage saving for
If currenttrendscontinue,theyclaim that"thebaby boom generationwill accumulatesubstantially
retirement.
largerlevels of
will have muchlargerpools of accessibleassets
and thusafterretirement
personalfinancialassetsthantheiroldercounterparts
of thecalculations
upon whichto drawto meetunexpectedcontingencies."Theiruse of disposableincomeas thedenominator
definition
of moneyincomeand,moreover,does notincludeall sources
raisesproblemssince itrefersonlyto a ratherarbitrary
of incomesuch as claims on futurepensions.This can be circumvented
by usingasset data,an approachfollowedby Gokhale,
Kotlikoff,and Sabelhaus (1996).
insuranceprograms
purposeshas declinedbecause of theexpansionof varioustypesof government
3 Saving forprecautionary
insurance,various typesof emergencywelfareprograms,and so on) to help families
(disabilityinsurance,unemployment
reducerisk.Moreover,therisingshareof wealthheld in annuitiessuch as Social Securityand privatepensionseliminatesthe
precautionarysavings needed to preventoutlivingone's assets. The savings need for bequest purposeshas also declined
in familysolidarity,
as shownby thedecliningshareof theelderlylivingwiththeirchildrenand the
because ofthedeterioration
risingfractionof marriagesendingin divorce.
4 Parker
(1999) presentsevidencethatthewealtheffectaccountsforno morethan20% oftheriseoftheconsumptionrate(which,
ofcourse,is mirrored
bythefallin saving).I arguehere,however,thatthewealtheffectmaybecomeconsiderablymoreimportant
in the future.Auerbach and Kotlikoff(1990) provide evidence thatcertainotherfactors,such as increasedgovernment
and the
tothenetnationalproduct(NNP) in the 1980s,largegovernment
deficitsinthe 1980s,savingdisincentives,
consumption
behaviorof stockprices,can explainonlya verysmallfraction
of thechangein thesavingrate.Theyalso dismissanothersetof
hypothesizedcauses, such as business cycle conditions,changes in income equality,and an increasein femalelabor force
participation.
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Table 1. Estimatesof FuturePopulationGrowthand ElderlyDependencyRatios
Annual
Average
Annual
lAverage
PopulationGrowth,

Actualdata

1995-2050

ElderlyDependencyRatios, 1960, 1980, and 1995

17.7%

19.9%

Forecasts
2010
2030
Census Bureau
0.13%
21.8%
Low populationgrowth
36.3%
0.74
Medium populationgrowth
22.3
37.6
1.24
22.7
38.3
High populationgrowth
Social SecurityAdministration
0.42
21.8
38.3
High Social Securitycost
21.4
Medium Social Securitycost
0.59
35.4
0.80
20.8
32.5
Low Social Securitycost
Lee and Tuljapurkar(low and highestimatesdefinethe95% confidencelimit)
0.03
22.3
Low populationgrowth
40.9
Median populationgrowth
0.63
22.3
36.4
1.23
22.6
33.1
High populationgrowth

21.9%

2050
35.2%
37.9
39.9
44.6
37.0
30.9
51.5
39.1
30.6

Note: The elderlydependencyratiois theratioof thepopulationover64 to thosein theworkingages from20 through64.
Census Bureau estimatescome fromU.S. Departmentof Commerce,Bureau of the Census (1996). For the low and high
theseestimatesdo not affectthe unexpectedresultsthatthe
estimates,I had to make severalminoradjustments;nevertheless,
elderly dependencyratios have a direct ratherthan inverse relationto the populationgrowthrate. The Social Security
estimatescome fromthe U.S. Social SecurityAdministration
Administration
(1999, table II-H-1). The Lee and Tuljalpukar
(1994) estimatescome fromtheirtable2. I estimatetheelderlydependencyratiofromtheirpopulationestimates,ratherthantheir
directestimatesof this ratio,to achieve consistencywiththe othercalculationsin this essay. Their stochasticallyestimated
because of the lognormaldistribution
they used in theirestimates.A more lucid
dependencyratios are slightlydifferent
proceduresthanin theiroriginalarticlecan be foundin Lee and Tuljalpukar(1998). For
explanationof theirstochasticestimating
none of theseestimatesare theassumptionsabout immigration
specifiedin muchdetail,althoughimmigration
may well be the
of futureU.S. populationgrowth.
crucialdeterminant

in the shortrun,I show in the
While thesevarious microeconomiceffectsmay be important
simulationanalysisherethatsome muchmoreimportant
long-term
changesdue to shiftsin the age
of thepopulationwill take place, and thesewill proveto have a morelastingimpact.
structure

DemographicChanges
A majorpartof themodeldeals withthechangingage structure
of thepopulationand theratio
betweenretiredto active workers.For analysisof the age structure,
one key conceptis the elderly
dependencyratio,whichis theratioof theelderly(thoseover64) to thosein theworkingages. Table
1 presentsnotjust theestimatesby theCensusBureauand theSocial SecurityAdministration
butalso
some much more sophisticatedestimatesby Lee and Tuljapurkar(1994; hereafter
L-T), who use
aboutbirthand deathrates.
probabilisticmethodsto take intoaccountuncertainties
Fromthesethreesetsofestimates,
we can drawtwosimpleconclusions.First,thenationis likely
to face a dramaticrise in theelderlydependencyratioin thenexthalfcentury.Second, therangeof
theseestimatedratiosis verylarge.For instance,theL-T calculationsgive a 95% probability
thatin
2050 thedependencyratiowill fallsomewherebetween30.6% and 51.5%. If uncertainties
aboutthe
futureof immigration
policies are takenmoreadequatelyintoaccount,therangeof theseestimates
would undoubtedly
be larger.
The nextstepis to considertheratioof retiredto activeworkers.This ratiodepends,of course,
notjust on theelderlydependencyratiobutalso on theage of retirement,
a phenomenonrequiringus
to take intoaccounttwo sets of circumstances:
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(i) Life expectancyis increasing.In 2000, a 65-year-oldpersoncould expect to live 15 more
years;by 2050, thiswillbe closerto 20 years.Moreover,because of advancesin medicine,theyoungold (i.e., thosebetween65 and 75) are healthierthana generationago.
(ii) Fromthemid-1960sto themid-1980s,thepercentageof menfrom60 to 69 in thelaborforce
declined(Quinn 1999). Since then,however,thispercentagehas leveledoff.For womenin thesame
was moreirregular.
In general,however,thepercentage
age cohortand in thesame period,thepattern
in thelaborforceremainedroughlythe same untilthemid-1980s,whenit began to increase.In the
1990s,manyofthosewho wouldhave retiredwereeithertakingbridgejobs orpostponingretirement.
A varietyof factorsunderlaythesechanges,includingchanginghealthstatus,evolvingpatternsof
and changesin mandatory
homeownershipand pensionavailability,
retirement
laws, Social Security
erodedsavings.
paymentsto the workingelderly,and thedegreeto whichinflation
In looking at the futureof saving, these demographicconsiderationshave two important
First,it is necessaryto takeintoaccountboththerisinglifeexpectancyand thepossible
implications.
ofretirement.
retirement
remainsthesame,future
cohortswill
Second,ifthecustomary
postponement
have to have a higherannualsavingrateto financethelongerretirement
periodbroughtaboutby the
futurecohortsshifttheirretirement
longerlifespan. If,by way of contrast,
age so thatthelengthof
retirement
remainsthesame,thentheywill need a lowerannualsavingratebecause theywill be able
to spreadaccumulationof a givenamountof retirement
fundsover a longerlifetime.

3. The ImpactofAgingon Saving
The analysisfocuseson aggregatenetsaving,thatis, theresultof grosssavingby activeworkers
and grossdissavingby retiredworkers.I begintheanalysiswithsome highlyunrealistic
assumptions
of saversand thenrelaxthemafterthemechanicsof themodel are clear.
aboutthehyperrationality

The Model
and a lifetimeincomeapproachtoward
For individuals,I startby assumingcompleteforesight
how
incomes
will
With
full
of
their
workersdecide
changeup to theirretirement,
knowledge
saving.
on theirsavingand consumption
rateeach yearto achievethreegoals: to maintaina constantlevel of
to finance
consumptionover theirworkinglifetime,to have enoughsavingsduringtheirretirement
each yearthereafter,
and to exhausttheirsavingsin their
some selectedfractionof thisconsumption
finalyear.The futuregrowthand interest
ratesof theeconomyare constant,whichindividualsknow
whenmakingtheirsavingdecisions.5All workersare assumedto have the same annualincomeso
thatthe resultsof the calculationsforone workercan be easily aggregatedforthe entireworking
population.6The initialmodel also assumes an equilibriumsituation,withthe only shocks coming
fromthechangingage structure,
thechanginglifeexpectancy,and thechangingretirement
age that
of
are introduced
This simpleapproachallows theimplications thebasic mechanism
by thesimulator.
rateswill rise.Althoughthemodelcan be complicatedto take
5 I arguein section5 thatgrowthwill actuallyfalland thatinterest

these changingparametersinto account in the optimizationproceduresfor determining
saving, the resultsare simplerto
whena ceterisparibus approachis used. The readercan interpret
thegrowthand interestratesused in themodel as
interpret
"average" ratesif the changesin theseparametersare consideredimportant.
6 The income patternof the average workerincomes actually rises for several decades before leveling off. Taking this
phenomenoninto account has only a minuscule effecton the simulationresults while enormouslycomplicatingthe
calculations.In the formpresentedin thisessay, the simulationscan be carriedout on a spreadsheetprogram.
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to be understoodand the resultsto be presentedin a systematicand quantitativefashionbefore
complicationsare introduced.
Each year, the L-T populationestimatesare divided between workersand retirees.Active
and retiredworkersareall thoseoverthe
workersincludeall thosefrom25 up to theage ofretirement,
Of
in
real
world
a fractionof thosebetween25 and 65
the
course,
only
preselectedretirement
age.7
of
must
in
labor
and
the
number
retirees
be multipliedby a similarfractionto
the
force,
participate
determinethe numberof retiredworkers.It should,however,be clear (and the simulationresults
thatthechosenparticipation
ratiohas no impacton thesimulationresultsabout
thisintuition)
confirm
changesin thenet savingrate.8
Workersare assumedto have labor incomeincreasingat a fixedpercentageeach yearfortheir
due to technicalchange and
workinglifetime,which takes into accounthigherlabor productivity
capitalaccumulation.Witha fullknowledgeof how theirincomeswill changeup to theirretirement,
theysave (or dissave) so as to have thesame consumptioneveryyearof theirworkinglifetimeand,
to have enoughsavingsto allow thema certainfractionof thisconsumption
afterretirement,
during
theiryearsof retirement
ratio).
(theconsumptionreplacement
Once savers know the futuregrowthand interestrates, they simultaneouslydecide their
consumptionreplacementratioand theirsavingpatternduringtheirworkinglife.If one of these is
In thelifetimeincomeapproachused in thisdiscussion,
known,theothercan be easily determined.
bothdecisionsdependon thedegreeto whichsaversdiscounttheirconsumptionduringretirement.
as I show here,lookingat thesavingdecisionin termsof theconsumption
Nevertheless,
replacement
whatis
ratioratherthanthesavingratioand thediscountrateprovidesa simplerway of understanding
other
to
not
to
but
also
to
economic
have
been
that,
now,
many
phenomena
up
happening only saving
consideredunrelated.
At thetimeof death,whichis assumedto be known,all individualswill have exhaustedtheir
abouttheage at death,thisis notan essential
savings.Althoughthemodelfeaturescompletecertainty
featureof the calculations.9In additionto the cohortof active workers,I assume, to simplify
calculations,threecohortsof retiredworkers(65-69, 70-84, and over 84). Following the same
assumethatwithineach ofthesethreeseparatecohorts,the
approachused foractiveworkers,I further
rates of dissavingare the same for all, an assumptionthathas only a minusculeimpacton the
For additionalsimplicity,
I
numericalresultsand is made forease of calculationand interpretation.
accounts
assume
that
Social
and
are
of
Security
pension
part personalsaving.
initially
Given these assumptions,the actual choice of the saving rate depends on the consumption
on thepart
ratio,theinterest
rate,andtheannualgrowthoflaborincome.Further
rationality
replacement
ofworkersis assumedby setting
thepredictedgrowthrateoftheirincometobe equal to itsactualvalue
overtime.To providea numericalexample,iftheinitialaverageincomeofworkersis 100,theirdesired
ratiois one, theirincomegrowthis 1.8% a year,theannualinterest
rateon
consumption
replacement
savingsis 3%, andtheworkerswork45 yearsandretirefor15,theywouldplantoconsume122.5 each
year.As a result,theywoulddissaveforthefirstseveraldecades of theirworklife,butduringthetwo

age of workat 25 so thatthe initialworkinglife of 40 yearswould be roughlysimilarto thatoccurring
7 I placed the starting

around2000. This meantthatthe L-T populationestimatesof the 20 to 64 cohorthad to be modifiedaccordingly.
This can be seen by comparingtwo situations,one wherebothadultsin thefamilyparticipatein thelabor force,thenanother
whereonly one adult worksoutsidethe home. In the firstcase, the per capita income (and saving) is twiceas high,but this
should not influenceeitherthe percentageof income saved underthe lifetimeincome approachfollowedin this model. In
retirement,
per capita consumptionin the firstcase is twice as high,but as a percentageof lifetimeincome it is the same.
the date of deathis not known,but all retireespurchasean annuityfroman insurancecompany,whichknows
9 Alternatively,
costs.
exactlythe average age of deathand has no administrative

8
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decadesofworking,
on thisaccount)is
theywouldsave enoughso thattheirtotalsavings(plus interest
at 122.5duringtheir15 yearsofretirement
sufficient
tofinancean annualconsumption
as well.Fromthe
data underlying
thisestimation,
we can calculatethatthe ratioof theiraccumulatedsavingto their
accumulatedincome(workincomeplus netinterest
is 21.8%.
income)duringtheirworkinglifetime
The assumptionthatworkersexhausttheirsavingsby timeof deathmeans,of course,thatthey
have no bequestmotiveforsaving.As I arguehere in moredetail,this simplification
may not be
in
unrealistic
the
decades.
coming
totally
One implicationof these assumptionsis thatthe average consumptionof retireesis usually
a fractionof the consumptionof currentworkers,unless the consumptionreplacementratio is
in the laborforceis higher
considerablyabove unity.This is because theincomeof thosecurrently
thanthatof retiredworkerswhenthelatterwereworkingand makingtheirconsumptionand saving
decisions. In the previousnumericalexample where the consumptionreplacementratio is unity,
retireesbetween70 and 84 will consumeonlyabout60% of whata current
workeris consuming.'0
Moreover,iftherateof thegrowthof averageincomeincreases,theaverageconsumptionof retirees
of theaverageconsumption
becomes an even lowerfraction
of workersbecause thegap betweenthe
annualincomeduringtheworkingyearsbecomes greater.
Thereare severalstringsto be tiedso thattheentiremodelcan be viewedas a whole.Since I am
betweentheseestimatesand mycalculations,I
usingtheL-T populationforecastsandwishconsistency
assumethatbetween2000 and 2050, thelifeexpectancyannuallyrisesby0.1 yearsso thatin 2050 the
lifeexpectancyis 85. I also assumethatinterest
income(or borrowing
withan
costs) are transactions
"externalsector,"whichis simplya bookkeepingdevice to keep thefinancialflowsbalanced.Net
incomeflowsfromthissectorarenot,however,verygreat.I further
assumethatin 2000, workersstart
and
to
65
at
25
retire
at
that
can
have
15
the
so
Nevertheless,
working
plan
they
yearsof retirement.
the
model allows
plannedretirement
age to be raisedas lifeexpectancyincreases.The presenceof
dependentsunder25 does not appearexplicitlyin the model,but I show herehow changesin the
ratiocan takechangingfamilysize intoaccount.Technicalaspectsandmore
replacement
consumption
detailsof thesimulationmodel,as well as otherassumptionsto simplify
thecalculations,are outlined
in AppendixB, locatedat myWeb site(http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Economics/fpryorl).
In brief,the core of the model is the annual calculationof combinedsaving of workersand
to derivethe numberof
dissavingof retirees,using projectionsof the U.S. demographicstructure
contextof saving,forinstance,whetherit
workersand retirees.I have not specifiedtheinstitutional
occurs throughthe Social Securitysystemor throughwithheldbusiness profitsthatare used for
investment
purposes.The hyperrationality
assumptionmeans thatindividualswithSocial Security
accountsor who own sharesin businessestakefullyintoaccountthesavingcarriedout in theirname
whentheymake theirdecisionsabouthow muchof theirpersonalincometheywill save. Afterthe
basic model is presented,I relax theseand a numberof otherrestrictive
assumptions,primarily
by
ratio.
showinghow theycan be relatedto changesin theconsumptionreplacement

The Main SimulationResult
Table 2 presentstheparameters
and theresultsof thesimulationthatwill be used as thebasis of
when
the
values
are changed.Theyrepresents
thesimulationresultsusingmy
comparison
parameter
"' In actuality,per capita consumptionof thoseover 65 is about 79% of thosebetween25 and 65, mostlikelybecause Social
Securitybenefitshave been raised in a fashionto narrowthisconsumptiongap. My model does not take thisphenomenon
directlyintoaccount,but,as arguedlater,such a policyacts in a similarmanneras raisingtheconsumptionreplacementratio
because it lowersthecurrentconsumptionof active workersand raises theconsumptionof retiredworkers.
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Table 2. InitialSimulation
Parameters

Populationgrowth
ratio
Consumptionreplacement
rate
Participation
Interestrate
Annualper capitalgrowthof labor income
and age of death
Retirement
2000
2050
Statisticson annual saving

Ratio of savingof workersto totalproduction
Ratio of dissavingof retireesto totalproduction
Net saving(gross savingminusgrossdissaving)
Change in net saving (percentagepoints)

Median L-T estimate

0.63
1.0
1.0
3.0%
1.8%
65 and 80 years
70 and 85 years
2000

2050

25.1%
11.7
13.4

22.5%
13.8
8.7

-4.8%

In laterdiscussion,thesearereferred
evaluationof themostrealisticvaluesforthevariousparameters.
to as the "initialsimulation."Several featuresdeserveparticularattention.
The workersin thismodelhave an impressiveannualsavingratein 2000, butit is offsetin part
considerable
dissavingon thepartofretireesso thatnetsavingforthecountryas a wholeis 13.4%.
by
value of netprivatedomesticsavingin theUnited
This is 3.8 percentagepointsbelow thepreliminary
betweensimulatedand actualresultsis due to thenetinflows
Statesin 1990s.1' Partof thedifference
fundsintotheUnitedStates,whichare nottakenintoaccountas privatesaving
of foreigninvestment
in the model and whichwere equal to about 1.2% of the GDP in the 1990s. Partof the remaining
of 2.6 percentagepointsis due to savingof privatebusinesses.As notedpreviously,the
difference
assumes(at least in theinitialdiscussion)thattheactivitiesof business(and Social
model implicitly
so thatindividualstake themfullyintoaccountwhen making
Security)are completelytransparent
theirown savingdecisions.This,of course,does notseemto be thecase. And partof thediscrepancy
betweensimulatedand actualsavingis due to theinfluenceof otherfactorsnotincludedin themodel.
Comparingthese resultswith the previouslynoted estimationsof Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1990), my estimatednet savingrateof 8.7% of theGDP in 2050 shownin Table 2 is considerably
higherthantheirestimateof 2.6% of thenetnationalproduct(NNP; roughly2.3% of theGDP, which
in 2040. Theirsavingmodelof constantage-specificsavingrates,however,
I use as mydenominator)
does not take into account eitherchanges in life expectancyor the retirement
age. Under their
myestimatednetsavingrateturnsoutto be roughly5.1%. In brief,thetwo
demographicassumptions,
butthefinalestimatednetsavingratearewithin
approachestowardsavingbehaviorareverydifferent,
2.8 percentagepoints.
The decline in gross saving of active workersover the half centuryis due to the factthat
in 2050 theywill have 45 yearsof workinglifeto
althoughtheystillhave 15 yearsof retirement,
rather
than
40
so thattheirannualsavingratedoes notneed to be
accumulatetheirretirement
savings
as great. The total gross saving rate of active workersminus the total gross dissaving rate
(consumptionof the retiredworkers)is the net saving rate and is shown in the table to fall 4.8
' Data on totalprivatesaving come fromthe NIPA, table 5.1, line 2, and fornet foreigninvestment
fromtable 4.5, line 45.
Privatesavingsincludesbothbusinessand personalsaving,but in thismodel,businesssaving is consideredpartof personal
saving carriedout by businessesfortheirindividualowners.
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Table 3. The Ratio of Net AnnualSaving to GDP Using Different
Parameters
2000

(A) L-T populationprojections
Low population
13.4%
Mediumpopulation
13.4
13.4
High population
(B) Annualgrowthratesof labor incomeper worker
0.9%
10.3%
1.2%
11.5
1.5%
12.5
1.8%
13.4
2.1%
14.2
2.4%
14.8
ratio
(C) Consumptionreplacement
0.8
11.1%
1.0
13.4
1.2
15.7
(D) Retirement
age
65
13.4%
70
13.4
(E) Interestrate
3%
13.4%
5%
10.2
7%
7.4

2050

Change

5.0%
8.7
11.3

-8.4%
-4.8
-2.0

4.3%
6.0
7.4
8.7
9.7
10.6

-6.0%
-5.5
-5.1
-4.8
-4.5
-4.2

11.4%
8.7
5.9

+0.4%
-4.8
-9.8

10.5%
8.7

-3.0%
-4.8

8.7%
5.6
3.1

-4.8%
-4.6
-4.3

Note: These resultsare derivedfromthe simulationmodel discussed in the textand in AppendixB on my Web page
All parameters
are thesame as in theinitialsimulationshownin Table
(http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Economics/fpryorl).
2 exceptthoseunderexamination.

percentagepointsoverthehalf-century
period,whichamountsa declineof slightlymorethana third.
This changein thenetsavingrateis thekeystatistic
of theanalysis.'2Whenotherfactorsnotincluded
in thissimplemodel are takenintoaccount(see thefollowingdiscussion),it mayrepresent
an upper
limitto thefall in saving.
These simulationsgenerateconsiderablenumbers,butto avoid clutterI reportonlythreecritical
statisticsforeach simulation:the initialand finalnet savingratesand the changein thenet saving
ratio.Table 3 reportsthepartialequilibriumresultswhenthemajorparameters
are changed,whileall
otherparameters
of the initialsimulationare held constant.
Panel A of the table depictsthe effectof populationgrowthon the level and change in net
saving.Since,as shownin Table 1,fastergrowthmeansa lowerelderlydependencyratio,theratioof
retiredto active workerswill also be lower.As a result,the rateof aggregatedissavingby retired
workersfalls,and thedeclinein thenet savingratiois also less. Clearly,thefall in thesavingratio
between2000 and 2050 is quite sensitiveto a changein the age structure
of thepopulation.13
Panel B of Table 3 shows thata fastergrowthof labor incomeincreasesleads to a decreasing
decline in the net savingrate.This comes about because, as pointedout previously,the fasterthe
1

These resultsand some of theconclusionsin laterdiscussionare derivedfroma simplemodelpresentedin AppendixC on my
Web page at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Economics/fpryorl.
13 In equation
Cl in AppendixC on myweb page, theonlyexpressionthatis affectedby a changein thepopulationgrowthrate
is [(1 - a)/a], wherea = the proportionof adultswho are active workers.Withthe fallingelderlydependencyratio,this
bracketexpressionrises,and the savingrateincreasesas well, otherfactorsremainingconstant.
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Table 4. Changes in Net Saving between2000 and 2050 withDifferent
ConsumptionReplacement
Ratios and Changes in OtherParameterValues
ConsumptionReplacementRatios (p)

0.8

1.0

1.2

Median populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 1.8%, interest= 3%
in 2050 at 70
+0.4%
-4.8%
1. Retirement
in 2050 at 65
-2.4
-3.0
2. Retirement

-9.8%
-3.5

Median populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 1.8%, interest= 7%
in 2050 at 70
-0.1
-4.3
3. Retirement
in 2050 at 65
-4.6
-5.7
4. Retirement

-8.5
-6.8

Low populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 1.8%, interest= 3%
in 2050 at 70
-2.6
-8.4
5. Retirement
in 2050 at 65
6. Retirement
-7.6
-9.3

-14.2
-10.9

High populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 1.8%, interest= 3%
in 2050 at 70
7. Retirement
+2.5
-2.0
in 2050 at 65
8. Retirement
+1.2
+1.4

-6.5
+1.6

Median populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 0.9%, interest= 3%
in 2050 at 70
9. Retirement
-0.3
-6.0
in 2050 at 65
10. Retirement
-4.8
-5.9

-11.6
-6.9

Median populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 2.4%, interest= 3%
in 2050 at 70
11. Retirement
+0.6
-4.2
in 2050 at 65
12. Retirement
-1.2
-1.6

-8.4
-1.9

to thatof an active
growthof workerincome,thesmallertheratioof a retiredworker'sconsumption
worker.As a result,the highergrowthratesof labor income are associated witha lower rate of
and therefore
thenetsavingratedoes not
GDP) ofretiredworkers,
dissaving(in relationto thecurrent
fall as rapidly.14What is important
to realize,however,is thatthiseffectis relativelysmall. More
specifically,an increasein the annual growthrate of workerincome of 1.5 percentagepoints is
associatedwithonly a 1.8-percentage-point
declinein thechangeof thenet savingrate.
Panel C of Table 3 displaystheresultsof varyingtheconsumption
ratio(p), which
replacement
is simultaneously
withtheindividual'sannualsavingrateand reflects
determined
thedegreeto which
savers value a dollar of currentand futureconsumption.I discuss in greaterdetail later (and in
butthatitis probablybetween1.0 and 1.2. In
AppendixA) thatitsactualvalue is highlycontroversial
tryingto understandthe simulationresults,anothercomplicationarises because in the model the
ratiomustbe combinedwithotherparameters
of themodelin thealgebraic
consumption
replacement
to
determine
the
net
which
means
that
a
number
of complex interaction
expression
saving rate,
effectsare occurringthat preventeasy interpretations.
For instance,in Table 3 an increasing
ratiois associatedwithgreaternetsavingin 2000 butwithless netsavingin
consumption
replacement
2050. For thisreason,itseemsmostusefulto focuson thechangein netsavingbetweenthesetwoend
pointswitha varietyof parametervalues, an exercisewhose resultsare reportedin Table 4.
Of the36 simulationresultsreportedin Table 4, 30 reveala decreasein thenetsavingratioby
2050, when various consumptionreplacementratios and otherparametersare plugged into the
simulationmodel.The exceptionsoccuronlywitha highpopulationgrowthrateand a retirement
rate

14In equationCl in AppendixC on myWeb page, z (theratioof theincomeon whicha retiredworkersbased theirsavingto the
income of a currentworker)declines,and this,in turn,raises the aggregatesavingrate.
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at 65 or witha low consumption
mechanisms
ratio,and theysuggesttwo counteracting
replacement
thatare sometimessufficiently
to
offset
the
In
results.
the
first
a
case, highpopulation
strong
general
growthresultsin a smallershareof retiredpeople so thattotaldissavingdeclinesin comparisonto
totalsaving.In thesecondcase, it is worthwhile
to notethatwhentheconsumption
ratio
replacement
decreases,thenetsavingratedecreasesmoreslowlysincetheworkingyearsin whichsavingstakes
place is much longerthanthe retirement
yearswhen dissavingtakesplace.'5 Thus, relativelylow
ratiosare associatedwithrelatively
replacement
consumption
highernetsavingsratios,and in certain
cases, thisis enoughto offsetthegeneralimpactof otherfactorswhichlowerthenetsavingbetween
2000 and 2050. This effectgives rise to whatmightbe called the "paradoxof profligacy,"
namely,
is associatedwitha smallerdecline(or even an increase)of net
thatlow savingforfutureretirement
savingin thefuture.
Panel D of Table 3 also showstheeffectsof a changein theretirement
age, butmoredetailsare
in
4.
If
the
at
rather
than
Table
retirement
remains
65
to
age
rising 70, theimpacton net
presented
In
10
of
18
the
retirement
is
mixed.
out
cases, keeping
age at 65 resultsin a more
saving quite
favorablechangein thenetsavingsituation(e.g., less negative)thanwhenit is raisedto 70. Several
factorsare at work.On theone hand,whentheretirement
age remainsat 65, grosssaving
offsetting
increasesconsiderablysince workersmustsave fora muchlongerretirement,
so thisresultsin more
on whichthey
netsaving,otherfactorsremainingconstant.Moreover,thebase level of consumption
base theirretirement
spendingis lower because consumptionduringthe workingyears was less
because of highersaving.On theotherhand,therelativenumberof retiredworkersis muchgreater
of themodel determine
whichof theseoffsetting
thanwhentheretirement
age is 70. The parameters
factorsdominatestheresults.'6
Finally,as shown in Panel E of Table 3, the impactof the interestrate is not strong.The
of severalvariablesbecause theinterest
rate
simulationresultsare theresultof a complexinteraction
incomeand thechoice of a consumption
has an impacton thelifetime
level,theratioof totalaverage
lifetimeincometo totalaveragelifetimeworkincome,theaccumulatedsavingneededforretirement,
and theratioof consumptionof retiredto currentworkers.'7
inmoredetailbecauseifthesavingdrought
thismatter
Itis usefultoinvestigate
occurs,theinterest
theresultsofanothersetofsimulations
rateis boundtorise.Table 5 presents
showingthechangesinnet
in
in
interest
is
other
as well.
when
the
rate
parameters
saving
change
accompaniedby changes
The resultsin Table 5 are quitemixed.The tablerevealsfourcases of theparadoxof profligacy;
rateleads
thenetsavingratiodecreasesin all cases. In 10 outof 18 cases, a higherinterest
otherwise,
a more favorablechange in the net saving ratio (i.e., a smallerdecline). This also occurs in the
combinationof parametervalues I believe most likely(reportedin line 1, p = 1). Althoughthe
interest
ratein thesesimulationsis changed4 percentagepoints,in 15 out of 18 cases thechangein
insensitive
to the
thenetsavingratiois less than2 percentagepoints.In brief,theresultsarerelatively

15 This can be shownby differentiating
equationC2 in AppendixC on myWeb page: (60/6p ) = [(1 - k)/(k- pk + p)] - p

and simplification,
(1 - k) [1/(k- pk + p)]2 (1 - k), which,afterrearrangement
yields(6a/6p) = [(1 - k)k]/[p(1- k) + k]2.
Both numerator
and denominatorare positive,and since k (the percentageof an adultlifespan spentworking)lies between
0 and 1, thenumerator
is positiveand less thanunity.so 0 < 6a/6p < 1, and savingrisesmoreslowlythantheconsumption
replacementratio.
16 Fromtheequationsin AppendixC on myWeb page, it can be readilydemonstrated
thattherelativevalues of thesavingrate
and the relativepercentageof the adult life span spent working(w in the previous footnotes)determinewhich effect
dominates.
17 The responseof saving to a situationwherethe interest
rateis not constantbut is risingover timeis discussed here in the
analysisof generalequilibriumeffects.
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Ratesand Changesin
Interest
Table 5. Changesin Net Savingbetween2000 and 2060 withDifferent
OtherParameterValues
ConsumptionReplacementRatios (p)

0.8

1.0

1.2

Median populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 1.8%, retirement
age = 70
-9.9%
+0.4%
-4.8%
1. Interest= 3%
-8.5
-0.1
-4.3
2. Interest= 7%
Median populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 1.8%, retirement
age = 65
-2.4
-3.0
-3.5
3. Interest= 3%
-4.6
-5.7
-6.8
4. Interest= 7%
Low populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 1.8%, retirement
age = 70
- 14.2
-8.4
-2.6
5. Interest= 3%
- 12.9
-3.1
-8.0
6. Interest= 7%
age = 70
High populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 1.8%, retirement
+2.5
-2.0
-6.5
7. Interest= 3%
+2.0
-1.6
-5.2
8. Interest= 7%
Median populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 0.9%, retirement
age = 70
-0.3
-6.0
9. Interest= 3%
-11.6
- 10.6
10. Interest= 7%
-0.9
-5.7
Median populationgrowth,annualper capita incomegrowth= 2.4%, retirement
age = 70
+0.6
-4.2
11. Interest= 3%
-8.9
12. Interest= 7%
+0.1
-3.8
-7.6

interestrate. If, however,the interestrate is not held constantbut is changingover time,this
conclusionmay have to be modified,but beforesuch a complicationis discussed here, several
additionalfactorsrequireattention.

4. Variations on the Theme
ChangingSome of theRationalityAssumptions
The realismof some of theassumptionsof themodelcan be questioned,forinstance,thatsavers
I have assumed.'8For instance,individualsaversdo notknowthefuture
do notact withtherationality
and
interest
rates,
and,
moreover,theassumptionthatthegrowthrateremainsconstantas the
growth
rate
declines
stretches
evenmore.It is, therefore,
to see whathappenswhen
credulity
saving
important
theseassumptionsare relaxed.
The consumptionreplacementratio p represents
notjust the degreeto which saversdiscount
also
theirbest guesses about what economic
theirconsumptionduringtheirretirement
but
years
In
will
be.
this
it
can
be
said
to
on
how
theirview of
depend
pessimisticor optimistic
growth
respect,
thefutureis in comparisonto whatactuallywill happen.
This partof the problemcan be exploredby askingwhathappensif the growthrateof labor
incomeis actuallydifferent
fromwhatit turnsout to be. Suppose thattheactualgrowthrateis lower
18

Some mightobject to the separationof the decision to retireand the decisions about saving. Nevertheless,a more exact
and savingdecisiondoes notyieldresultsnoticeablydifferent
fromthoseobtainedby
modelingof a simultaneousretirement
blendingthe resultsof separatesimulationswiththe different
parameters.
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thanthegrowthforeseenby savers.Since netsavingis greaterwhenthegrowthrateis higher,workers
will save morethantheyneed to in orderto meettheirgoals of a specifiedconsumption
replacement
ratio.If,forinstance,actualgrowthturnsout to be 1.2% a yearbutthe saversbelieve it to be 1.8%
(and do notevercatchon to whatis reallyhappening),a quick simulationshows thatthenet saving
ratedoes notfall4.8 percentagepointsbetween2000 and 2050, as predictedby theoriginalmodel,
but only 1.8 percentagepointsin the period.Thus, conservatismin judgingchanges in economic
reality(in this case, extremeconservatismthatlasts a half century)acts like an increasein the
ratioand, in mostcases, slows down thedeclinein netsaving.By way of
consumption
replacement
unrealisticpessimismaboutthegrowthrateleads to a greaterfall in thenet savingrate.
contrast,
We can also, of course,assumethatsaversare not sufficiently
rationalto save accordingto the
of
lifetimeincomeapproach.One alternative
savingsmodel is thattheysave a constantproportion
ratiois
theirincomeeach year.Experiments
along theselines,however,show thatifthereplacement
It is possible,of course,to abandonany saving
thesame,thesimulationresultsare littledifferent.19
function
rationalizedby theoryand assume,in themannerof Auerbachand Kotlikoff
(1990), thatthe
in the saving
an
even
declines
greater
age-specificsavingratesare constant, approachthatpredicts
we move fromtheory,however,the less able we are to determinethe effectsof
rate.The further
rateon the finalsavinglevel.
different
parameterssuch as thegrowthor interest
in
of
the
ratioalso makesitpossibleto interpret
terms
at
individual
Looking
saving
replacement
in
of
in
of themodel.For instance,many
changesin theannualsavingrate terms changes parameters
have arguedthattherecentfall in the savingsratereflectsthefactthatworkerstodayhave a higher
and wantto spend theirmoneywhile it is in hand. This can be viewed as
rateof timepreference
ratio(shownby Engen,Gale, and Uccello 1999), and the
a declinein theconsumption
replacement
situation
implicationsof such a changecan, in turn,be simulatedby themodel. Anotherinteresting
arisesifindividualsaversdo nottakeintoaccounteitherthesavingcarriedout in theirnamethrough
withheldearningsof the corporationsin which they own stock or the Social Securitypayouts
as
and government
can be interpreted
Then suchsavingby corporations
promisedby thegovernment.
in
an
increase
the
a typeof involuntary
ratio,
replacement
consumption
savingthatcan be considered
thantheyexpected.
and theretireeswill have moreassets to liquidateduringtheirretirement
In brief,varioussavingbehaviorsthatdeviatefromthestrictassumptions
originallysetforthcan
values for the
them in termsof different
be taken into account in the model by interpreting
of
ratio.We can loosen theassumptionsof strictrationality themodeland
consumption:replacement
stillobtainusefulresultsfromthemodel.
Such considerationsraise anew, however,the question about the reasonable value of the
existsin the
ratioto use in thiskindof analysis.Considerabledisagreement
consumption:replacement
into
account
do
not
take
of
is
or
should
be.20
literature
aboutwhatthevalue p actually
Most analyses
in kind,such as Medicare.Althoughthe
the consumptionof retireestakenin the formof transfers
is
values chosenforthesimulationreflecttherangeof ratiosfoundin theliterature,
myown intuition
are takenintoaccount;my
thatthep is probablybetween1.0 and 1.2 whenall typesof consumption
19 In majorpart,thissimilarity
is due to myassumptionthatwithintheworking-agepopulation,thepopulationin each age year

is offsetby the
is the same. Thus, in the lifetimeincome approach,the high saving rate of those approachingretirement
ratiois roughlythe same as the
dissavingof thosejust enteringthe labor forceso thatoverall savingfora givenretirement
average saving using a Keynesiantypeof saving function.
20 Three main approachesto this problemcan be found in the literature.
Some derive this rate using a dynamicstochastic
derivedfromconsumption
model,othersuse theadvice ofpersonalfinancegurus,and stillothersuse information
optimization
ages. The derivedratesrangegenerallyfrom0.8 to 1.2. For further
budgetsof consumptionunitsheadedbypeople of different
discussionof thismatter,see AppendixA.
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decline in the net
reasoningis discussed in greaterdetail in AppendixA. Althoughthe short-term
savingratein thelate 1980s and 1990s suggeststhatp is falling,thedeclinein averagefamilysize and
of theelderlyact in the oppositedirection.
therisingmedicalexpenditures

OtherFactors Influencing
Saving: Partial EquilibriumEffects
how certainexogenous changes mightaffectparticularparametervalues of the
Investigating
is the
model gives additionalperspectiveon theresults.In thisrespect,themostimportant
parameter
to
consider
how
in
and
it
is
ratio
useful,therefore,
changes other
p,
consumptionreplacement
in
model
influence
the
value
of
nottakenintoaccount the
p.
might
parameters

FamilySize
In part,the consumptionreplacementratio p reflectsthe numberof childrenin a family.If
theparentsgenerallyhave a lowerpersonalconsumption
than
a familyhas a largenumberofchildren,
to divideamongall
in a smallerfamily(assumingtheydo notallocatea fixedamountof consumption
oftheirconsumption
children).Theirsavingrateto replacea givenfraction
duringtheirworkingyears
even
while
national
net
fortheirretirement
the
lower,
savingratein themiddleof
periodis, therefore,
the 21st centuryis higherbecause theseretireesare dissavingless. But thereis anotherimpactof
a largerfamilysize as well since more childrenleads to a more rapidlygrowingpopulation.As
netsavingratearisingfroma lowerp arisingfroma larger
a result,theslowerdeclinein thelong-term
in
the
slower
decline
netsavingoccurringwithfasterpopulationgrowthshown
familysize reinforces
in panel A of Table 3 (whichdoes nottakethisfactorof thenumberof childrenon familysavinginto
declinein thenetsavingratein two respects.
account).In brief,largerfamiliesdampenthelong-term

ChangingMedical Needs of theElderly
An important
partof consumptionof the elderlyis formedical care. Accordingto Cutlerand
Meara (1999), medicalcostsare risingfasterfortheelderlythananyothersegmentof thepopulation.
If theelderlywishto maintainotherpartsof consumption
and to coversuchrisingmedicalcosts,then
theymustraise theirsavingduringtheirlifetime,whichreflectsa higherconsumptionreplacement
of the elderlyis carriedout through
ratio.Of course,most of the saving formedical expenditures
Medicare taxes duringthe workingyears (which lowers currentconsumptionand raises forced
are drawnfromthe
saving), and most of the expendituresfor medical purposesafterretirement
is not
Medicare trustfund.But the institutional
formthroughwhichsuch saving and expenditures
it is the ratioof totalexpendituresof retiredworkers(includingmedical care) to their
important;
expenditures
duringtheirworkingyearsthatis thekey.

Political Clout of theElderly
Up to now,I have assumedthatSocial Securitypayoutsarebased on whata workerputsintothe
transfers
fromthe workersto the retired.
system.But the currentsystemfeaturesintergenerational
When theelderlyare able to use theirpoliticalmuscleto raise the Social Securitypayoutsover and
above what theywould have received on the basis of theirown contributions,
the consumption
ratioincreases.Thatis, consumption
of activeworkersis lowered,whileconsumption
of
replacement
retiredworkersis raised.
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PrecautionarySaving

The modelassumesthatthereis no motiveforsavingto avoid runningout of incomein old age.
Withtheincreasingannuitization
of incomeduringretirement
throughpensionsand Social Security,
this motive of saving declines, and, in this respect,the model appears realistic,and no reof theresultsare necessary.
interpretations

Savingfor Bequests
Up to now, I have assumed thatthereis no bequest motive.In recentyears,some, such as
Gokhale, Kotlikoff,and Sabelhaus (1996), have argued that the importanceof passing on an
inheritance
to othersis declining.More specifically,
thehighU.S. divorcerateand thehighmobility
of bothchildrenand theirparents(eitherdivorcedor stillmarried)meansthatcontactbetweenfamily
membersis decreasingand thedesireforleavinglargesumsto descendantsis ebbing.Some informal
of thisassumptionis providedby the sightof white-haired
driversbehindthe steering
confirmation
wheel of expensivecars withbumper-stickers
or
proclaiming,"I'm spendingmykids' inheritance,"
theadviceofpopularadvicecolumnistssuchas AnnLanderswhotelltheirreadersthattheyowe their
childrennothingafterraisingthemand payingfortheireducation.
On a moreanalyticlevel,savingforbequestpurposesraisessome problemsbecause theone-toone relationbetweenannual saving and the consumptionreplacementratioassumed in the model
is broken.That is, the bequest motiveeitherraises saving duringthe workingyears or lowers
yearsso thatthesimulationresultsrepresent
consumption
duringtheretirement
onlyan upperlimitof
decline.
the
and
also
Moreover,bequests
change
saving
consumptionbehaviorof those
saving
I
receivingthem.Of course,all theseeffectscould be added to themodel,butforanalyticsimplicity,
omitsuch an exercisesince I wish to focusprimarily
on demographiceffectson saving.

A VeryBriefCommenton Changes in theLabor Supply
rateis fixedovertheentireperiod,its
I notedpreviouslythatwhenthelaborforceparticipation
on
be
value
has
no
the
results.
It
designated
impact
might asked, however,how changingthis
ratioovertimemightaffecttheresults.Experiments
along theselines show thatthenet
participation
ratiochanges,at leastwhenthey
savingresultsare also notchangedwhenthelaborforceparticipation
over the 50-yearperiod.Otherexperiments
withmodification
of different
occur in even increments
of
of
the
model
revealed
interest.
nothing
parts

5. Some Broader Implicationsof the Simulation Results
At thispoint,itis necessaryto stepbeyondtheconfinesofthepartialequilibrium
model,notjust
to takeintoaccounttheimpactof othereconomicactorsbutalso to considersomegeneralequilibrium
effects.
Other Sources of Saving
Althoughthesesimulationresultssuggestin mostcases a fall in the personalsavingrate,this
does not necessarilymean thatthe totalsavingratewill decline. Since the model focusesonly on
to take intoaccountothertypesof savingin theeconomy
voluntary
personalsaving,it is important
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beforegeneralizingabout the overall saving rate.Three othersources of saving deserveattention:
saving.
foreigncapitalinflows,businesssaving,and government
countries(Bosworthand
Since agingof thepopulationis occurringin almostall industrialized
Burtless1998), sooneror latertheywill facea decliningpersonalsavingratein thefutureas well. As
thisdoes notseem a promisingsourcefor
a result,theywillhave less capitalto export,and,therefore,
in
the
United
States.
if theEuro strengthens
in the
fall
in
the
Moreover,
personalsaving
offsetting
an
safe
haven
for
funds
from
the
countries
it
serve
as
so
alternative
developing
comingdecades, may
thatthissourceof capitalimportsintothe UnitedStateswill decline.
Anothersourceof savingis fromretainedprofitsby businesses,whichare usuallyreinvested.
Such decisions act, among otherthings,to raise the value of the company'sstock.Auerbachand
Hassett(1991) arguethatbecause of suchimpacts,consumersare able to "piercetheveil of corporate
saving" and, at least in part,to takeit intoaccountin makingtheirpersonalsavingdecisions.If the
betweenthesetwo formsof savingis not one to one, thensome of thisbusinesssaving
substitution
a
suchinvoluntary
personalsaving.As notedpreviously,
represents typeof involuntary
savingactsto
raise the consumptionreplacementratio,and, as the elderlycash in theirassets to financetheir
retirement
however,I have foundno
saving, theirconsumptionwill be higher.In the literature,
to suggestthattherateof suchbusinesssavingwillchangein thefuture.
credibleargument
Moreover,
ifitdoes increaseso thatp rises,undermostparameter
values thenetsavingratiowill fallmoreinthe
futurebecause theretireeswill be spendingat a higherrate.Thus, a higherrateof businesssavingis
hardlythe answerto thedroughtin personalsaving.
sectoras well. If it
Similarly,involuntary
personalsavingmightoccurthroughthe government
comes aboutthroughhigherSocial Securitytaxes,thenit can be arguedthatindividualswill pierce
thisgovernment
veil and taketheseforcedsavingsintoaccountin theirvoluntarysavingdecisions.
if
is notone to one,netpersonalsavingmightfallless thanit shouldhave,and
Again, thesubstitution
a higherconsumptionreplacementratio will result.But this has a paradoxical impact. As the
triesto "save" Social Securityeitherby increasingsocial securitytaxesor by raisingthe
government
retirement
ratio and may, in most
age, such measuresact to raise the consumption:replacement
situations,lead to a greaterfallin netsavingfortheentireeconomyin thefutureso thatby 2050 the
effectshouldbe relativelysmall.
can raise thecurrent
rateof savingby runningbudgetsurplusesand
Similarly,thegovernment
the
national
debt.
eitherto returnpartof thisforcedsavingin the
Nevertheless,
lowering
temptations
is strongamongpoliticianswishingto
formof reducedtaxesor to increasegovernment
expenditures
be reelected.

GeneralEquilibriumEffects
Althoughbusiness and government
saving do not seem verypromisingoffsetsto the fall in
one
credible
deserves
As the savingratefalls,theinterest
attention.
rate
personalsaving,
possibility
effectsso thatthe
mayrise,and assetpriceswouldfall,whichcould,in turn,introducesomeoffsetting
simulationresultspresentedso farcould represent
onlyextremevalues of theactualfallin netsaving.
At this point,the analysis becomes complicated,and I can touch on only the most important
effects.
counteracting

Saving and InterestRates Once Again
To the extentthathigherreal interestrates induce more personalsaving, investment
could
increase,and economicgrowthcould be higher.But empiricalevidence(e.g., Hall 1988) suggeststhat
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theimpactof a changein therealinterest
rateon savingor consumption
rateof
(i.e., theintertemporal
is small. The theoreticalevidence is also not strong:In the shortrun,income and
substitution)
effectsoffseteach other.In thelongrun,thesimulationscarriedoutin Table 5 showthat
substitution
theeffectof a higherinterest
rateon netsavingis usuallysmall,and in onlyhalfthecases does thenet
savingrateshow an increase.Even thoughworkersmaymakelifetimesavingdecisionsin a different
mannerthanI have modeled,it seems difficult
to imaginehow thesewould offsetthedemographic
effects.

WealthEffects
rise in theinterest
ratewould,of course,resultin a fallof assetprices.A useful
Any long-term
is
the
difference
between
starting
point
changesin netsavingas measured,respectively,
by flowand
stockdata (Gale and Sabelhaus 1999). By the end of the 1990s, the stockdata reveal savingto be
twice the rate of net investment.
Most of this alleged saving,however,representsa capital gain
from
a
revaluation
of
assets
thatis reflectedin a risingvalue of Tobin's q (Tobin and
resulting
Sommers2000). Obviously,a fall in savingand a rise in real interest
ratescan reversethisprocess.
morepeople holdinghigh-priced
assetsretireand cash themin to finance
Moreover,as increasingly
theirretirement,
thedownwardpressureon theseassetpricesbecomesgreater.This changewill affect
bothpersonaland pensionfundportfoliosso thatthosewithpensionplans on a definedcontribution
basis will receivemuchless thantheyexpected(and pensionplans withdefinedbenefitsmay face
bankruptcy).
Such a fallin personalwealthmay well resultin moresavingas people scrambleto replacepart
of theirportfolio
losses. Severaloffsetting
effectscould occurfromsuchadditionalshort-term
saving.
If itresultsin increasedinvestment
and growth,thelong-term
fallin savingcould be reduced(Table
3, panel B). But ifitleads to Keynesiantypeofrecessionor ifthefallin assetpricesleads to a loss of
investorconfidence,thensavingover the long termcould be even further
reduced.Given thatthe
focus
of
this
is
discussion
and
further
primary
analysis demographic,
modelingof theseeffectsmust
be leftto anothertimeand place.

OtherOffsetting
Effects
We can imagineotheroffsetting
factorsto thosepresentedin thepartialequilibrium
model.Any
rise in consumptionand corresponding
declinein savingand investment
means thatinvestment
has
less to fall in case of a loss of investorconfidence.This means thataggregatedemandshocksto the
economywouldbe smallerand that,as a result,recessionswouldbe milder.This,in turn,could result
in a smallerdeclinein thelong-term
savingrate.
Anotherpossible offsetting
effectcould come throughthe government,
assumingthatcurrent
laissez-faireattitudestowardthe economypersistfor the next half century.But problemsarise
because manysuchmeasurescould onlyhave a short-term
effect.If,forinstance,savingof workersis
encouragedin the shortrun,in the long run when these savers retire,theywill draw down their
savings in greaterannual amountthanif such measureshad not been taken,which would have
a negativeimpacton netsavingat thattime.Or ifthegovernment
uses tax fundsto shoreup pension
plans and banks so thatprivatesaving is safer,people mightend up saving less because their
thegovernment
used taxfundsto invest
precautionary
savingsneedsare lower.If,by way of contrast,
in theeconomy,suchoffsetting
effectsof privatesavingmightbe reduced,and,
directlyor indirectly
because the growthrate would be higher,the decline in the saving rate would be less. Or if the
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governmentallowed more immigrationof young foreignworkers,the decline in the elderly
dependencyratio(and thenet savingrate)could be partiallyoffset.
effectsoccur,thedeclinein savingwill be
In brief,to theextentthattheseor othercompensating
an overlypessimisticcase forthefuturenet
less thanI have indicatedso thatmyestimatesrepresent
to theorizeaboutthissituationin greaterdetail,we runface
savingratio.Whileitwouldbe interesting
to face intotwo inescapablefacts.First,so manyfactorsmustbe takenintoaccountthata complex
general equilibriummodel is necessary to cover the major possibilitiesthat lie outside my
demographicfocus.Second, anyfinalconclusionsdrawnfromany suchmorecomplexmodelwould
whose values are unknownsincelittlerelevantempiricalevidence
undoubtedly
dependon parameters
is at hand.

EconomicGrowth:Once Again
Up to now, I have also assumedthateconomicgrowthis exogenous,buta changingsavingrate
can have an importantinfluence.This situationis complicated,however,because the impact of
a fallingsavingrateon economicgrowthdependson whethertechnologicalchangeis exogenousto
changesin thecapitalstock(i.e., disembodied).If so, thena Solow typeof neoclassicalgrowthmodel
leads to theresultin theshortrun,thepercapitaGDP will growmoreslowly,butin thelong runthe
If,however,technologicalchangeis endogenousand, letus
growthratewill be thesame as before.21
ofpreviouscapitalaccumulation(reflecting,
has
e.g., thatthenew technology
say,partiallya function
to be embeddedin new equipment),thena declinein thesavingratewilllead to slowergrowthin both
the shortand thelong run,a conclusionthatseems morerealistic.
whathappensto such
To forecastthefuturegrowthrateof theUnitedStates,we mustinvestigate
therateof saving,and theratio
keyvariablesas therateof technicalchange,therateof depreciation,
of capitalto output.In the 1990s,grossprivatedomesticinvestment
and consumption
of fixedcapital
and
of
the
Other
17.4%
12.3%
GDP.
were,
things
(depreciation)
respectively,
being equal, if the
will
no
rate
falls
more
than
5.1
it
cover
and the
percentagepoints,
longer
privatesaving
depreciation,
netcapitalstockwould startto shrink.At thispoint,GDP growthcould be maintainedonlyin one or
bothof two events:if governmental
savingand foreigncapitalinflowsoffsetthedeclineof private
if
theentirecapitalstock(disembodiedtechnicalchange) were
or
technical
change
affecting
saving
the
of
to
offset
high
impact thedecliningcapitalstock.Neitherseems verylikely.
sufficiently
In theinitialsimulation,
whereI triedto give themostrealisticvaluesto thedifferent
parameters,
the saving ratefalls 4.8 percentagepointsbetween2000 and 2050. Most of the othersimulations
reportedin thevarioustablesresultin a fallof thesavingratebetween4 and 6 percentagepoints.This
suggests that capital accumulationwill be much slower. Unless technical change increases
it therefore
seems likelythateconomic growthwill be considerablylower in 2050
dramatically,
thanat thebeginningof the21st century,
otherthingsbeingequal. The variableleastlikelyto remain
will lead to moreeconomic
ratio.If thisfalls,each unitof investment
constantis thecapital/output
growth.From 1950 through1999, thisratiofellat an annualrateof 0.12%; from1975 through1999,
it fellat an annualrateof 0.34%; and in the 1990s,itsannualrateof declinewas considerablyhigher,
in computingequipment.Economic eventsin the
presumablybecause of the increasedinvestment
21

This counterintuitive
the productivity
of additionalunitsof capital
long-termresultoccurs because, at greaterinvestment,
investmentdeclines because of diminishingreturns.When the capital stock is sufficiently
large, the growthinduced by
will be quite low. If saving and investment
additionalinvestment
are lower,the capital stockwill also be lower so thatthe
impactof diminishingreturnswill be much less.
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openingyearsof thenew millennium
suggestthatdramaticupsurgein technologicalchange,whichis
in
one
sector,
occurringprimarily
may not last long.
the
most
outcome
of a declinein thesavingratethatI have describedis a declinein
Thus,
likely
therateof economicgrowth.As shownin Table 3, as thegrowthrateof annualincomefalls,thenet
each other.
savingratealso declinesso thatthefall in economicgrowthand in netsavingreinforce

OtherConsiderationsand a BriefSummary
For themostpart,thisdiscussionof a declinein thenetsavingratein thefutureis detachedfrom
context.As such,my argumentaboutthe savingdroughtis muchbroaderthanthe
institutional
any
current
discussionaboutcrisesin particular
typesof saving.For instance,in recentyearsconsiderable
of the Social Securitysystem,although
concernhas been expressedabout the futurebankruptcy
some
the
of
this
threat
has
about
been raised(Baker and Weisbrot2000).
skepticism
recently
reality
such
as
and
Shoven
evidence
thatsome decades fromnow the
Schieber
Others,
(1997), provide
solvencyof privatepension fundsis also in doubt. Their argumentrests on many of the same
demographiccircumstancesthatI have discussed here. But these two types of crises are only
manifestations
of a moregeneraldeclinein net savingthatseems likelyto occur.
particularly
One last issue regarding
Social Securityalso deservesmention.In theirsimulationsof theSocial
sensitive
Securitysystem,Lee and Tuljapurkar(1998) arguethattheresultsfor2050 are particularly
to changesin GDP. In theirparticular
model,theydo not,however,takeintoaccountthedeclinein
are factoredinto
thenationalsavingrateand theslowdownin thegrowthrate.If suchconsiderations
theirsimulations
or thoseof others,thenthefuture
financialhealthoftheSocial Securityappearseven
moreprecarious.
inpercapitagrowth.
The government
facesseveralbasic policyoptionsto offsetthedeceleration
The purpose of this essay, however,is to diagnose, not to prescribe.In this era of unbounded
to makepessimismonce morea fashionabletrait
optimismaboutfuturegrowth,it is notmyintention
model
on therelativeconsumption
of active
focusingprimarily
amongeconomists.Nevertheless,
by a
and retiredworkersand therelativepopulationsize of thesetwo groups,it shouldbe clear thatthe
even ifmyestimates
personalsavingrateseemslikelyto fallconsiderablyoverthenexthalfcentury,
an
limit.
The
idea
of
the
simulations
some
magnitudesinvolved under
provide
represent upper
of
do
not
seem
different
sources
saving
assumptions.Alternative
promising,and as a result,the
The growthof outputper workerwill decline,theinterest
ratewill rise,
implicationsare unsettling:
need to face squarely.
and assetpriceswill decline.These are problemsthateconomicpolicymakers

Ratio
Replacement
AppendixA: A Noteon theConsumption
ratesin
The magnitudeof theconsumptionreplacementratiois notknown,and forthisreasonI use threequite different
focusesonlyon theissue definedin termsof thedecisionsof individualsaversand does
my simulations.Most of theliterature
not take intoaccountthe otherfactorsoutlinedin the text.Three main approachesto thisproblemcan be distinguished.
model,takingintoaccount,
Engen,Gale, and Uccello (1999) presenta sophisticatedstochastic,dynamicprogramming
rate,the interestrate,and the
among otherthings,randomshocks to income duringthe workinglifetime,the time-preference
ratesof 80% or 72%, dependingon whetherthetimepreference
growthrateof income.They end up witha medianreplacement
ratesare, respectively,
0% and 3%. Comparingthe resultsof thistheoreticalmodel to actual data of income and assets from
severalsurveys,theydrawa startling
conclusion:Althoughthenationalsavingmaybe low, U.S. individualsmay stillbe saving
at theiroptimalrate.Nevertheless,
as Carroll(1999, p. 168) has noted,"The 'dirtylittlesecret'of themoderndynamicstochastic
and withplausibleassumptionsaboutotherparameters,
optimizationmodel [is that]withmultiplerealistickindsof uncertainty,
of parametervalues."
the model can predicta verywide rangeof behavior,dependingon the preciseconfiguration
A second approachlooks at thepopularfinancialliterature
to see whatfinancialgurusare advisingthegeneralpublic. In
a briefreview,Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) note thatmost advocate saving so thatthe replacementof consumptionis
roughlybetween65% and 85%. A thirdapproach is to look at budgetaryneeds of those at different
ages. Engen, Gale, and
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Uccello (1999) pointoutthatretiredworkershave no commutingexpensesand lowermortgageexpenses(since theseare usually
theirfamiliesare smaller(thenumberof "equivalentadults" in thefamilyfallsfrom
Further,
paid offby thetimeof retirement).
1.68 to 1.30). On theotherhand,theConsumerExpenditureSurvey(U.S. Departmentof Labor 2000) for 1998 shows thatthe
increase in average out-of-pocketmedical expenses on an equivalent adult basis representsroughly4% of consumption
on an equivalentadultbasis ofa familyheadedby a personbetween25 and 65. Moreover,in 1998,percapitain-kind
expenditures
incomefortheelderlythroughMedicareand Medicaid (U.S. Census Bureau 1999) amountedto about35% oftheconsumption(on
an equivalentadultbasis) ofa familyheadedby a personbetween25 and 65. Addedto theamountofsavingadvocatedbypersonal
financeexperts,the trueconsumptionneeds of the retiredrange from85% to 125% of those in the workingages. Gokhale,
on thoseat
and Sabelhaus (1996) approachthebudgetneedsfroma different
Kotlikoff,
expenditures
angleand dividegovernment
of thosewho were70 and 80 years
different
ages in a moreprecisemanner.Theyarguethattheratioof nonmedicalexpenditures
old to thosewho were 30 and 40 rangedbetween0.63 and 0.91 in 1987-1990,buttheyalso pointout thatmuchof thishigher
of incometo themthroughtheSocial Securitysystem.
expenditureof theelderlywas due to a redistribution
Given the lack of agreement,I have used a range of consumptionreplacementratiosthatencompasses most of the
estimatesthatare derivedin thesethreedifferent
ways.
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